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Abstract 
The main purpose of this work is to question the utility of public policies and norms adopted 
by the state to promote participation in elections, in this case fines as an incentive to increase 
voter turnout. Considering the fine as a norm that affects the economy of people, this thesis 
seeks to lay out if fines affect the population in different ways according to their social class. 
To this end, the case of Perú -- a country with mandatory voting and an electoral fine -- is 
analyzed. In 2006, the government carried out an electoral reform, which ultimately divided 
counties in the country into three categories: nonpoor, poor, and extremely poor. This public 
reform established that with a higher level of poverty, lower fines are imposed. In this regard, 
a critical analysis of this reform is made, hypothesizing that reducing the fine would affect the 
participation of the poorest areas more significantly than the non-poor areas.  
 
On the other hand, certain authors point out that compulsory voting systems encourage people 
to make an uninformed vote. In this context, Perú is among the countries with the highest 
invalid voting rate in the world. Thus, within a trend of low levels of participation, the electoral 
behavior of those who previously voted to avoid the fine evolves. By decreasing the incentives 
to vote, will those really interested who show up at the polls? The second axis of this thesis 
will be tested through the hypothesis that reducing the amount of the fine will decrease the 
percentage of people that mark an invalid vote, in a country with compulsory vote such as Perú.  
 
Keywords: Fines, compulsory voting, invalid vote. 
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List of abbreviations with explanation 
 
JNE: The National Elections Jury is an autonomous constitutional body of the Peruvian State. 
Its purpose is to control the legality of the exercise of suffrage, electoral processes and popular 
consultations. 
 
ONPE: National Office of Electoral Processes. This is an autonomous and constitutional entity 
in charge of the organization of the electoral processes,  deliberation of electoral results in Perú. 
 
UIT: The Taxation Unit (UIT) is the value in the currency of Perú, soles, established by the 
state to determine the amount of fines. 
 
RENIEC: The National Registry of Identification and Civil Status, is an autonomous body of 
the Peruvian State responsible for the identification of Peruvians, granting the National Identity 
Document. 
 
NC: No category (of poverty) 
 
S: Fines for abstention. 
 
M: Fines for not showing up at the polling station as coordinator of the table. 
 
F: Total number of people fined (S+M) 
 
CV: Coefficient of variation  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
In the construction of the electoral system, there is a common element in the Latin American 
context, compulsory voting. In other latitudes, Belgium was the first country to introduce 
compulsory voting laws in 1892. Other pioneers of the system were Argentina, which 
implemented equivalent laws in 1914 and Australia, who did so in 1924 (IDEA, 2017). 
Nowadays, there seems to be a clear predominance of a voluntary voting system worldwide. 
There are 172 countries with voluntary systems, which  significantly outpaces the number of 
countries with compulsory voting (ibid).  In times when the percentage of people who exercise 
their right to vote has declined drastically, measuring the degree of representation of 
governments and their legitimacy becomes a confusing task (Hupe & Edwards, 2012). For this 
reason, the way in which the electoral system elaborates the normative framework of 
compulsory voting is an element worth analyzing.  
In Perú, once a person deposits his vote in the ballot box, the president of the polling station 
puts a stamp on his national identification document. Without this stamp, the person faces 
different sanctions. Among those are the impossibility of carrying out banking procedures, 
signing contracts and even making use of the passport to travel abroad. Regarding fines related 
to the vote, there are two different types.  The first one is given in case of not voting; and the 
second one is exercised in case the person does not attend his/her position as member of the 
electoral table at the polling station. The meaning of this measure can be analyzed from two 
positions. Some see it as a way to encourage participation by making people avoid the payment 
of a certain amount, whereas others see it as a punishment for those who do not exercise their 
right to vote. The literature offers different arguments for both cases. On the one hand, an 
increase in participation and benefits for the poorest of society support its existence. In contrast, 
it can be seen as an element that affects the freedom and choice of individuals inferring 
monetary punishment for an act that should be voluntary. Attempting the freedom that should 
exist in democracy is the main argument raised by its detractors. 
About this subject, a recent event occurred with the amount of the electoral fine. Normally the 
amount of the fine is adjusted annually or by-elections according to the growth of the economy 
of the country. However, in 2006, after the realization of the presidential elections and prior to 
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the regional elections of the same year1, there was a partial reduction in the amount of the fine 
for the poorest people, dividing the population according to their level of poverty into three 
large groups: extremely, poor, and non-poor. For this, the district in which people live at the 
time of the election is taken as a reference, giving the category of poverty to the district 
according to the data of the National Institute of Statistics of Perú. This measure sought to 
make the fine an element of coercion which is fairer according to the social class of the person.  
Therefore, through the analysis of electoral data from the period 2002 to 2016, an attempt will 
be made to review the consequences of decreasing the amount of the fine in the district 
according the class. By means of empirical analysis with data of the elections in Perú from 
2002 to 2016, it will be an attempt to test the hypothesis regarding whether a reduction in the 
amount of the electoral fine discourages the electoral participation of the poorest classes. For 
this, a comparison of the participation data obtained from the electoral institutions of Peru in 
the elections carried out before the reform will be made and compared with the results once the 
electoral reform has been carried out.  
On the other hand, a large part of the electoral literature indicates that compulsory voting helps 
the most popular classes to be more represented, assuming a positive correlation between 
education, poverty level and electoral participation. However, in compulsory voting regimes, 
there is a possibility that people will vote without worrying about getting informed about the 
candidates' electoral programs as a way to avoid the fine. This lack of political interest and 
information could be considered an unwanted effect in a system of compulsory voting, because 
there will be less incentive for political interest and understanding. Consequently, assuming 
that with the reduction of fines forcing citizens to vote, those less interested in the elections 
would not be interested in attending the elections. Therefore, especially citizens who are more 
interested in participating will do so, making invalid voting levels lower. Hence, an attempt to 
prove the hypothesis that the decrease of the electoral fine, would lower the percentage of 
people marking invalid votes. 
 
                                               
1 The second presidential round of the year 2006 was held on June 4, and the publication of the reform to the 
electoral law number 28859 it was published on August 3 of the year 2006. The regional elections of the year 
2006 were carried out on November 19 of the year 2006, being  the first election with categories of poverty for 
the application of fines (ONPE, 2006). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The notion of compulsory voting 
At the end of the nineteenth century, intellectuals estimated that with the expansion of the vote, 
it would be the dominant classes and the elite, the ones who would reflect more about the 
benefit from act of voting (Tingsten, 1937). This is because they would be able to understand 
that their vote does not have greater significance in a larger universe. The development of 
electoral studies over time, however, have been demonstrating just the opposite. From the 
perspective of the rational choice theory, the utility of the act of voting is close to zero, 
considering the cost involved in the process resulting in a paradox in rational terms (Downs 
1957; Blais & Young 1999). Yet, as the lack of participation threatens democracy itself, 
Maldonado describes that “some countries have tried to ease the process of voting for citizens 
in the form of automatic registration, weekend voting, machine voting, and absentee voting” 
(2015:2). Thus, these measures are a way to make access to the vote as transversal and as 
democratic as possible. Similarly, compulsory voting was presented as another tool to prevent 
abstention. Here, fines function as a legitimate negative incentive in order to promote 
participation in voting (Lijphart 1997; Rovensky, 2008).  
 
As a way to be even more specific regarding the concept of compulsory voting, some scholars 
insist on clarifying that compulsory voting “is misnomer” (Caylak & Kaser, 2017:422). 
Compulsory voting does not force people to vote for X candidate, but simply forces them to 
attend the polling station. In this regard, Lever (2008) describes the act of voting, at least in a 
liberal democracy with common standards, as a secret act, where it is not possible to know if 
the vote was executed correctly. However, because the term compulsory voting is widely used 
in the literature, it will be used in this investigation.  
 
To several authors, legality defines the core essence of compulsory voting. Simon Jackman 
described compulsory voting as "a system of laws or norms mandating that enfranchised 
citizens turn out to vote often accompanied by a system of compulsory voter registration and 
penalties for non-compliance" (2001:1). For Sarah Birch, "compulsory voting can be defined 
very simply as the legal obligation to attend the polls at election time and perform whatever 
duties are required thereof electors" (2009:2).  
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Nevertheless, not every scholar shares the same view about compulsory voting. Authors such 
as Matsler highlight the benefits of compulsory voting because it guarantees a level of 
participation that would not be possible due to other alternatives such as voluntary voting 
(2002). On the other hand, those opposed to mandatory voting argue that it contradicts 
democracy by restricting the rights and freedom to choose whether to vote or not. In other 
words, "between ideals of social interest and individual freedom, opponents of compulsory 
voting opt for the latter" (Maldonado, 2015:5). In this way, the fact that the law can compel 
people to vote, by the use of force, leaving aside individual freedom of choice, is questioned. 
The debate also contains a normative aspect: "some academics see voting from a civic duty 
perspective, in which the focus relies on principles such as representativeness, majority will, 
inclusive participation, and legitimacy" (Maldonado, 2015:4). Studies such as those conducted 
by Fowler (2005) and Singh (2015) indicate that abstention is higher among the poorest sectors, 
women, discriminated social groups, and inhabitants of remote areas, which reinforces the 
cycle of exclusion of their interests in the political system. This could be alleviated with the 
adoption of mandatory voting. Lijphart emphasizes that in addition of being an effective 
enhancer of turnout in practice, the basic logic of compulsory voting as an egalitarian 
instrument is that it prevents greater participation of the richest sectors (1997:1-2). Otherwise, 
Jackman and Miller (1995) described the effects of compulsory voting in terms of participation 
as an increase of 10 to 15 percentage points, in industrialized countries, besides similar 
numbers can be found in Latin America (Fornos, Power, and Garand, 2004). 
In all the definitions described above, the authors use the idea of compulsory voting related to 
a group of norms and laws that imply a punishment for not complying (the act of voting). The 
type of sanctions and its implications become relevant as a negative incentive to make the 
decision to attend or not on the day of the election. These mechanisms of sanctions vary 
according to the context of the country in question, and one of the most common tools of 
sanctions are fines. Likewise, the amount of fine varies according to the country. There are 
cases where the fine is proportional to the salary, as in Ecuador, or where it differs according 
to the levels of poverty in the region, as it is in Perú. Other countries such as Argentina have a 
fixed amount.  
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Invalid votes  
Why deposit an invalid vote when the effort or cost associated to attend the polling station are 
already made? The vote itself is maybe the most visible element in the representative 
democracy. For that reason, the origin of the invalid vote and possible explanations need to be 
explored from the conceptual point of view. In this aspect, Power and Garand described three 
main sources of studies related to invalid votes, "the institutional approach, the socioeconomic 
approach, and the political-protest or regime-level approach" (2007:434). The institutional 
edge points out the design and operation of institutions as the main responsable, where the 
complexity of norms, laws, or the way the vote is built can be translated in a higher number of 
invalid votes, leaving socioeconomic variables in the background (Powell, 1986; Jackman, 
1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Perez-Liñan, 2001; Power & Garand, 2007). As an example 
they describe countries with compulsory voting, where people who normally would not go to 
vote, at the end they do in order to avoid sanctions (2007). In the same line, scholars claim that 
in countries with compulsory voting, the number of invalid votes can be the equivalent to the 
level of abstention in countries with voluntary voting system (Lavareda 1991; Power & Garand, 
2007). Secondly, with respect to the socioeconomic variable, this approach describe that invalid 
votes are the connected with the class of the voters. Here variables such as illiteracy, the degree 
of urbanization, or income can affect the number of invalid votes. This explanation find support 
in the German political scientist Dieter Nohlen, who describes how the educational level of the 
electorate can be connected with the number of invalid votes, due to the level of complexity of 
the electoral process it will affect those with the lowest level of instruction (2004), were 
education and class are also connected. In other words, people with less education are more 
likely to mark the vote in the wrong way, and as result voiding its vote. Other authors such as 
Arbache pointed out that "educational levels can also be related to voluntary spoiled votes, 
when people lack the ability to decide who to vote for" (2015:33). The last branch of studies 
about invalid votes raise the issue of this type of vote as a way of showing discontent, protest 
or claim the lack of alternatives (Power & Garand 2007; Uggla 2008; Driscoll & Nelson, 2014). 
To exemplify, Power & Robert (1995) described how during the lowest level of the dictatorship 
in Brazil during the 60s and the 70s the number of invalid votes increase.  
In relation to the definition of the invalid votes, scholars such as Aldashev and Mastrubuoni 
(2016) identified three categories of votes in elections that are using paper as a way to vote. 
The "valid, blank (the voter did not express any preference), or invalid (the election officers 
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consider that the voter did not express her preference correctly)" (2016:4). Once the process is 
done, people in charge of counting votes in the polling station categorized each vote according 
the categories above mentioned.  Among the votes considered as invalid, are those who marked 
more than one candidate, or put any sign on the vote that can violate the secret aspect of the 
ballot (ibid). On the same edge of studies, Cohen defined an invalid vote as “one that has been 
destroyed (e.g., ripped) or marked in such a way that election officials are unable to identify 
the voter’s candidate preference” (2016:3). The same author described how the existence of 
two types of invalid votes is commonly accepted, the ones not modified or frames are generally 
known as blank and those that have been modified but cannot be attributed to any candidate as 
null (ibis). While it is true, blank, null or spoiled votes can respond to different reasons, Driscoll 
and Nelson point out, "the blank may stem from voters' ignorance or apathy (...) a deliberately 
invalidated ballot is a clear and costly signal of voter discontent" (2014:547). However, since 
the aim of the present thesis is to compare the number of voters before and after the reform of 
the electoral system in 2006, and not search for an explanation in the variation within blank 
and null votes, the invalid votes are going to be considered as the sum of null and blank votes 
in the Peruvian elections under analysis. 
 
Findings in the prior literature 
According to Blais (2003) there are three elements that could be named with confidence in 
terms of electoral behavior. First, the percentages of participation in the elections are higher in 
the richer countries, second, the adoption of a mandatory voting system makes the percentages 
of participation are higher, and finally that the levels of participation are higher in more 
contested elections because the vote would be more valuable, according the rational choice 
theory (Downs, 1957). However, by dissecting this statement, the scheme becomes more 
complex. In the field of electoral studies, there is a large amount of literature regarding electoral 
behavior and participation, but some authors such as Timothy Power emphasize the little 
knowledge about compulsory voting in the comparative field (2009), affecting especially the 
Latin American context. Among the reasons listed by the author, the vast majority of the 
research has focused on countries with compulsory voting system, but also with high levels of 
development such as Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg and one canton in the case of 
Switzerland. Countries that differ largely in the economic variables and cultural context with 
countries in Latin America. 
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In Latin American only six countries appear with voluntary system, Nicaragua, Chile, 
Venezuela, Suriname and Colombia (IDEA, 2017). Within this group, Power indicates that 
Nicaragua in 1987 and Venezuela in 1999 suppressed compulsory voting by the left or center-
left government (2009). In the Chilean case, compulsory voting is the most recent in the region, 
held in 2012 in the government of Michelle Bachelet's center-left coalition. Colombia, for its 
part, appears as the only country in the list that has a long history of voluntary voting (ibid), 
indicating a certain ideological tendency of governments when making the decision to opt for 
a voting system in the Latin American context, as regard the levels of participation in countries 
with compulsory voting.  
The idea that compulsory voting increases the levels of participation can be find a broad list 
arguments and data in favor. Jackman demonstrates that compulsory system increases 
participation levels by 15 percent average (1987). This percentage remains in the range of 10 
to 15 percent in most Western democracies tested (Blais & Carty 1990; Blais & Dobrzynska 
1998; Franklin, 1996, 2004; Blais & Aarts, 2005). In this aspect, the research of Blais et al 
(2003) found that in order for the CV system to be effective, it must be accompanied by 
sanctions. To reach this conclusion, 61 cases were reviewed, covering countries categorized as 
new and old democracies according to the division made by Norris (2002). Regarding to this, 
IDEA (nd) describe several ways that are having the states to enforce the participation of its 
citizens in countries with compulsory voting system. In the case of Belgium, it can result 
complicate to work in the public sector if the person cannot prove its participation in the last 
elections, in the case of Bolivia the person could be not able to take its salary if is not able to 
present the card given after participate in the elections, in  Singapore the person will be 
removed from the electoral roll and be reintegrate only if is able to prove its absence in front 
of the authorities in charge of the process2.   
In this way Blais, launches the question about what the most effective types of sanctions are 
when compelling people to attend elections, making emphasis on the lack of production of 
material regarding this edge (2003). Besides, among the attempts to compile the different ways 
that the states have to force their voters, "the available data remain relatively rudimentary and 
impressionistic" (Power, 2009:100).  
                                               
2 The integrate list of countries with compulsory voting system and the list of different types of sanctions 
describe by IDEA is available in the following link: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-
turnout/compulsory-voting 
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With respect to the discussion of poverty and political engagement, classic intellectuals were 
part of the debate as well.  Alexis Tocqueville described how the "universal vote really grants 
the government of a society to the poor" (1981: 300). Nonetheless, in words of the French 
intellectual, the poor are too busy to be able to deal seriously, to inform themselves and 
participate in the political debate. In the same line, almost two centuries later Arend Lijphart 
argues that there is a relationship between the level of poverty and education of the people and 
their electoral participation (1997). In other words, those who are in the most affluent classes 
would have a higher level of electoral participation. In this discussion, the Dutch author 
proposes the existence of compulsory voting as a measure that would make the popular classes 
more involved in politics. In this way, their concerns and needs would be considered by the 
ruling class, putting pressure on the agenda (ibid). This idea has had great acceptance and 
diffusion in the specialized literature, finding a strong connection between the social class and 
the level of political participation. Otherwise, Larry Bartels refers to how the disparity in the 
accumulation of wealth finally affects the power of action of the popular classes against the 
lobby exercised by the richest classes. In his words “in theory, public opinion constrains the 
ideological convictions of political elites in democratic political systems” (2008:3). However, 
the academics Maroto and Dosek (2018) make emphasis on the methodological problems of 
the studies developed on this problematic, due to failures such as the choice of the time periods 
to be analyzed and the lack of comparative cases using the same methodological criteria. An 
example expressed by the authors is the assumption implied by Lijphart (1997) that the poorer 
classes would be closer to redistributive social policies. 
The compulsory vote as an effective measure to increase the levels of electoral participation 
finds detractors as defenders in the literature. One of the elements with little discussion is the 
beginnings of fines for not participating in elections. Scholars such as Myers and Cavalcanti 
(2014) mention how in the State of Georgia in the United States, in 1777, a fine of 
approximately five pounds was imposed in case of non-voting. Although it is not specified 
what is it was understood for justifiable reasons, it is the first record of coercive measures to 
punish the lack of voting. 
One of the last cases of a country who changed from compulsory voting system into voluntary 
system is Chile in 2012. This change, as described by Matta (2009), does not occur frequently, 
and only five cases of countries that passed from compulsory to voluntary voting are registered. 
In the Chilean case, with the reform all persons over the age of eighteen became automatically 
qualified to vote. Among the arguments put forward by the parties in favor of the change, the 
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argument that the population in Chile was aging was included, and it was precisely the youngest 
ones who were not registering. By becoming a voluntary voting system, the voter registration 
list would be expanded and there would be no drastic reduction in the levels of participation. 
However, in reality the levels of participation fell sharply. Also, changes were observed in the 
age component of voters, where the youngest increased participation and the older ones 
decreased, but in net terms the total number was lower. In addition, studies where a sampling 
was done by social class observed that the richest communes diminished to a lesser extent their 
electoral participation. In any case, the class component did not present itself as a decider to 
generate conclusions (Cox & Gonzalez, 2016). 
Figure 1. The case of Chile 1988 - 2012. In orange the level of participation, and in blue the voter 
registration.  
 
Source. Cox & Gonzales 2016. 
In relation to the effects of fines, León (2017) presented an article referring to the effects in 
turnout from changes in the amount of the sanctions in the 2010 municipal elections in Perú, 
by comparing voters exposed to different levels of fines. Among the findings, the author 
expressed that "voters whose turnout decisions are more sensitive to a change in the fine do not 
have distinct policy preferences. Furthermore, voters who respond to the reduction in the fine 
by abstaining do not acquire less political information" (León, 2017:3). Nevertheless, the study 
of León as a single case study, in one specific district in Perú, cannot be used as a reference to 
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test the level of participation of the indigenous population. Another research found related to 
the effects of fines and the level of participation is the one carried out by Paredes and Martinez 
(2017). In this work the scholars review the possible causes of the drop-in participation 
percentages by analyzing the second electoral rounds of 2006 and 2016. Among the findings, 
the authors mention that members of social strata with higher education and income would be 
less susceptible to changes in the amount of the fine, this is in line with the existing literature 
regarding the correlation between wealth and participation. However, this period of study does 
not include the elections carried out before the reform, and also omit the general election of 
2011 and the first round without justification. One of the characteristics of Peruvian democracy 
is the large number of elections carried out, so it is possible to generate studies with a more 
representative statistical significance. 
 
Finally, Anthony Fowler (2013), describes how the great amplitude of studies based on 
correlations of how an exogenous element affects the levels of participation can leave all 
positions satisfied. As an example, it enumerates the studies of Herron (1998) and Mackerras 
& McAllister (1999) that indicate that a large percentage of participation in elections mostly 
favors the left political parties. In contrast, the opposite argument finds validity in the studies 
of Highton and Wolfinger (2001) regarding right wing parties. Therefore, the author describes 
that to avoid methodological errors and lack of objectivity "the most compelling causal 
evidence on the effects of turnout comes from studies of small shocks to turnout" (Fowler, 
2013: 161). In this way, the study of the districts in the Peruvian case, being the smallest 
territorial unit, it would allow to know better how an exogenous element, such as the fine, 
would have effects on the levels of participation. 
In summary, the literature regarding compulsory voting in the Peruvian case is limited, rather 
from the legal field, or emanated by public institutions of Perú that do not have an academic 
methodology in the elaboration of documents. It is so characterized by being descriptive of the 
way in which the electoral system and institutions are working. As well, studies of the 
implications of compulsory voting measured in terms of social class, or the impact of the fine 
in people behavior are scarce. While it is true, the level of detail of such information is high, 
there is no theoretical discussion about it. Therefore, the literature review prior to the beginning 
of this research was based on the experience of foreign countries with and without compulsory 
voting, partly because the debate is always present, even more so when the levels of 
participation in politics continue to fall in the western democracies. 
16 
 
In the Australian context, Jackman found that in wealthy constituencies such as Higgins, the 
invalid vote in the 2004 elections reached 3%, but in the case of Greenway, a working-class 
district with a high rate of migratory population, the vote invalid reached 12% (2005), giving 
sustenance to the literature that relates educational level and wealth with low levels of invalid 
votes. Among the reasons found in his study, the migratory edge rise in this case, due to the 
complexity of the voting system in Australia, a person coming from not a non-native English-
speaking country, it would be more likely to make mistakes when voting. As a contrary,  the 
research of Cisneros (2013) describes how in the federal elections of 2009, in Mexico, social 
movements organized around the idea of attending the elections and mark null. The aim of the 
movement was to express discontent and lack of credibility for the political parties. Inside of 
these groups, the participants belonged to the educational segment above the average, 
appearing as a counter-argument for theories that connect in a positive way the vote of protest 
with higher levels of instruction (Galatas, 2008).  
 
Figure 2. Median of people exercising an invalid vote. 
Source. Data collected from IDEA (2013) by Superti (2016). Sample made of 1439 elections in non-
compulsory voting system and 566 with compulsory system at national level. 
On the other hand, scholars such as Rodriguez, show how the existence of penalties end up 
transforming the electoral participation into a mandatory act, where the voter is informed 
shortly before voting and his biggest incentive is to avoid economic penalization (2010). 
Besides, Schlomoff shows as measures in charge of increasing the levels of electoral 
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participation, they end up increasing the numbers of people attending to vote, but without any 
type of involvement in the previous political discussion (2009). Moreover, Timothy Power 
describes how in the Latin American political context the change from a compulsory voting 
model to a voluntary one would have more benefits, such as the appearance of a more informed 
and conscientious type of voter. This result would be worthwhile, considering the decrease in 
participation levels when going from a mandatory system to a voluntary one (2009). 
In the case of Brazil, a survey conducted by the Datafolha Survey Institute3 in 2010 showed 
that in the presidential elections of that year, in which parliamentarians are also elected, 30 
percent of the respondents had forgotten the name of the person for whom they had voted 
within a week after the elections. This situation supports the arguments of those who target the 
voters of countries with compulsory voting, as less informed people, who care more to attend 
the elections than to inform themselves in an appropriate manner (Myers & Cavalcanti, 2014). 
Additionally, the case of Brazil is interesting taking into account that has the largest electoral 
registry with compulsory voting system (IDEA, 2016), and third world largest democracy in 
the world. In this regard, the investigation by Power & Roberts reviews the legislative elections 
between 1945 and 1990, finding that high levels of participation, derived in part from the 
compulsory voting system, are having high levels of invalid votes. On the other hand, contrary 
to the belief that null or blank votes were a way to demonstrate discontent during the period of 
military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, the indexes of invalid votes have remained 
constant and even increased. As example the authors described the parliamentary election of 
1986 in which the level of null and blank voters reached nearly 40 percent (Power & Roberts 
1995).  
In the Peruvian case, Cecile Lavrad describes how certain poor districts of Lima show a 
percentage of null and blank votes above the average in all elections since the return to 
democracy in 1980 until 2006 (2007). However, voting null or blank does not imply low 
participation of these districts. The participation in the Peruvian case, in the decade of the 
eighties, showed a strong class connection, where the social class found a grip on certain 
electoral behavior. However, the electoral analyzes made by Lavrad are limited to the 
departmental level. In this way the districts, which are those that present a level of fines 
differentiated according to their level of poverty, are outside the analysis. In the same line, 
                                               
3 Datafolha Research Institute 2010 source: http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2010/presidente/indice-
4.shtml 
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Cohen (2016), exemplifies the notoriety of the issue in the Peruvian and Latin American 
context by showing that in the surveys conducted prior to the first electoral round in Perú in 
2016, the null or blank vote ran second after Keiko Fujimori, daughter of Alberto Fujimori.  
Furthermore, according to data collected by LatinoBarômetro4, Perú is in second place in the 
region in levels of invalid votes, only behind Bolivia, a country that also has a mandatory vote. 
Among the responses of those consulted, those who declare that they have voided their vote 
intentionally more than 55% stated that they did so in protest against the existing candidates 
(Barometer, 2016). Something that has consistency considering the high levels of corruption 
in Perú that have led to jail, or being underdogs of justice to all the Peruvian presidents elected 
in elections since 1980. The most recent case of the suicide of former president Ollanta Humala 
graphs the freshness of events in Peruvian events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Information extracted from: http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp  
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CHAPTER II 
The Peruvian context 
To understand from where the data that is present will be taken, it will be made a brief 
description of the origin of compulsory voting in Perú and its way to enforce the citizens to 
attend the elections. Additionally, a description of the reform of 2006 and its reach, to finalize 
with the enumeration of the main reform that increases the universe of the voters, as measures 
that included people from groups that can potentially be considered as one of the sources for 
invalid votes. Taking the argument from the literature that associated class and its correlation 
with invalid votes, affecting groups like the indigenous population or the illiterate ones. 
Compulsory voting in Perú 
Authors such as Valentin Paniagua (2003) mentioned that since 1826 there were already 
electoral laws that clarified the different sanctions in case of not omitting the suffrage. In said 
laws it was established that those who omitted to vote could not opt for public offices of popular 
representation. It was specified that the sanction was due, among other reasons, to "(...) 
indifference to the good of the community and in contempt of its own right, being able more 
in them a criminal indolence than the love of the country" (2003:66). In addition, two were the 
reasons to be absent on the day of the elections, illness and having missed the previous election. 
The Senate on the other hand, should have a list of the people who had defrayed, since with the 
names of this list the highest positions of the public administration would be chosen. In 1834, 
the electoral law used the fine for the first time as a tool to punish those who did not exercise 
their right to vote. In addition, sanctions such as the loss of citizenship for one or two years and 
the specification of amounts in "pesos" are established. 
 
Furthermore, once an election was missed without a valid justification, the person lost his/her 
right to vote for the successive elections. This could be verified with the signature and stamp 
that was placed on the electoral book, which was the document at that time was used to prove 
that a person had voted (Paniagua, 2003). As of 1945, an unofficial custom began, partly due 
to the succession of non-democratic governments that ruled Perú during the 20th century, to 
grant amnesty to the omitted in the amounts of their electoral fines after a while. This remained 
constant until 1999. In that year, by means of law 27190 the amount of fines that had not been 
paid by citizens was reduced. This reduction, instead of a total abolition, occurred partly due 
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to the pressure of the electoral institutions. Given that an important part of the budget for its 
operation comes from the collection of electoral fines, as is the case of the JNE and the ONPE. 
 
Table 1. Measures for absence to suffrage in Perú 1826-2006 
Year Description of the sanction 
1822 Impossibility to participate in the successive elections and prohibition to 
work in public positions.  
1828 Publications in the official newspaper of the republic of the Republic, the list 
with the name of those who did not fulfill their right to vote. 
1834  It begins to charge a fine for omitted, corresponding to 4 pesos of the time. 
1896 It is mandatory to register in the National Electoral Registry, in order to 
exercise the right to vote and also to be elected. 
1931 The fulfillment of the right to vote is understood once the voter acquires the 
stamp and the signature of the President of the polling station of the 
corresponding election. The price of the fine was established based on two 
days of salary of the person who did not go to vote. 
1945 A non-regular period of amnesties of fines begins, after a certain period after 
the election. This practice will last until 1999. 
1999 A discount is applied, not an amnesty, by means of a law (21790) that 
reduces the amount of fines corresponding to past election processes. 
2006 A differentiation is applied in the fine, according to the level of poverty that 
the district in question has. The amount is established as a percentage of the 
ITU. 
It ends with the electoral fine for abstention to Peruvians abroad, but it is 
maintained for those selected as member of the polling station. 
Own elaboration with the information published by Panigua (2003) and JNE (2016). 
 
Nowadays, the institution in charge of fining the absentees in the elections is the National Jury 
of Elections. With the National Office of electoral processes, the two organisms in charge of 
the elections in Perú, have carried out 52 elections at the national, regional and municipal level 
in the period 2000-2018 (ONPE, 2013). A considerable figure and that contrary to the world 
trend maintains a high participation rate in the elections. 
 
In the 2016 election where Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was elected president, there was an 81.2% 
participation in the first round. Making a simple comparison with the its two neighbor countries 
in the south and the north with voluntary voting system can result in a good picture of the 
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situation in the region regarding turnout. In the case of Colombia, its last elected president in 
2018 Ivan Duque was elected with 54.22% of the total electoral roll. In the case of  Chile its 
percentage of participation it was  46.7%5 in the first presidential round of 2017, considering 
the entire electoral roll. For this reason, shredding the different existing institutional and legal 
mechanisms to maintain high levels of electoral participation is a key element of analyzing. 
 
Another important feature of mandatory voting in Perú is that with the amendments to the 1979 
Constitution, voting also became mandatory for Peruvians residing abroad. Therefore, all 
Peruvians were required to establish a residence. In the case of living abroad, and not having 
updated his electoral address, his last registered home was taken into account, thus becoming 
omitted. On the other hand, there is an important number of the electorate (3,86%), making its 
performance decisive. As example, the result of the elections 2006, where their support for one 
of the candidates almost avoids the second arrival of Alan Garcia for the presidency. With the 
reform of 2006, Peruvians living abroad ceased to be subject to a fine, but those who were in 
charge of the polling stations maintained the fine of 2% of the UIT. 
 
Electoral reforms and compulsory voting 
Among the main reforms of the Peruvian system are the inclusion of women in 1933, and the 
possibility of voting for the illiterate in 1979. During the same year, the age to vote decreased 
from 21 to 18 (Sardon, 2010). These two reforms expanded the electoral register, and in the 
case of the integration of illiterate people, it would have an impact on the number of null votes 
over the years. In the case of the illiterate, a large part of this group belongs to indigenous 
communities. Besides, the indigenous population in South America represent the most 
disadvantaged groups, suffering directly from problems related to the implantation of a culture 
and model of forced development, in addition to being seen as people that impede national 
development (Popolo ; Jaspers, 2014). The clash of their worldviews is opposed to the modern 
idea of state and, any kind of law or norm that can affect in a disproportional way this 
vulnerable group at elections has a critical importance in the representation of their interests. 
However, the lack of literature and historical statistics to compare the evolution of compulsory 
                                               
5 In the presidential elections of 2016, the electoral roll was made of 14.347.288 citizens allowed to vote and 
6.650.000 exercised its right. Source: Emol.com https://www.emol.com/noticias/Economia/2017/11/19/884005/Menos-de-
la-mitad-de-los-chilenos-voto-Participacion-electoral-alcanza-un-46-del-padron.html 
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voting where indigenous populations are concentrated, do not allow studies on the way in 
which the compulsory vote. 
Another reform that broadened the electoral roll and had effects to discuss regarding the 
obligatory nature of the vote, it was launched in 1979 allowing Peruvians residing abroad to 
vote in the presidential elections, a pioneering change in the South American context. Authors 
such as Soldevilla (2015), make it clear that this reform, though it extends the right to 
participate in the election of authorities does not allow residents abroad to choose its own 
representatives, making this expansion a passive participation.  
Figure 3. Compulsory voting and Peruvians abroad 
 
Source. Castillo (2016) 
 
While it is true, it includes this large group of almost four millions voters in the representative 
democratic system, it does not allow them to have more interference in the political plane. As 
an example, Castillo cites countries such as Croatia and Colombia that "have special 
constituents of national residents living abroad" (2016:46). In addition, this lack of inclusion is 
debatable because until 2006, prior to the electoral reform, they were also subject to electoral 
fines in case of omission. This rule changed, in the case of the omission, but it was maintained 
in the case of not showing up to work as a member in charge of the polling station in the voting 
center. 
23 
 
During the decade of the 1980s, Peru also returned to have competitive elections. Along with 
this, it began to become evident that having a centralized body in charge of the administration 
of the entire electoral system was inefficient. It was difficult to combat episodes of corruption, 
due to the lack of human resources to monitor. The lack of transparency policies that make the 
work carried out by the JNE difficult to audit (Salsedo, 2017). In addition, Rubio emphasizes 
that the deficiencies arising from the lack of professional staff, with exclusive dedication to the 
National Electoral Board (JNE) hindered the correct preparation of elections (1999).  
With the Constitution of 1993, a reform was made to the National Elections Board. In this way, 
the tasks and functions of the JNE are divided between the ONPE, and the RENIEC. The 
functions of these three institutions are regulated at the constitutional level by article 177 
(Salsedo, 2017). They are performed by these three organisms and among their main tasks are: 
i) JNE: An institution with constitutional status and that enjoys autonomy in its 
functions. It is headed by a plenary of five members, among whom is a judge of the 
Supreme Court, a member of the Board of Prosecutors, a dean of a faculty of law of 
public universities and a dean of a faculty of law of the private universities, and a 
member of the bar association of Perú. It is also the highest instance in electoral justice 
and its decisions are final, without the right to appeal. The JNE exercises control over 
all elections held in Perú, including elections for the positions of President, 
Congressmen, Governor and Vice-Governor, Governor and Vice-Governor, Mayor and 
Municipal Councilor. Finally, the JNE is in charge of collecting the fines related to the 
electoral process. Fifty percent of said fines become funds available to the JNE for its 
operation. The other fifty per cent goes to the Peruvian fiscal coffers. 
ii) ONPE: Autonomous body and constitutional type. It is responsible for logistics in 
elections, referendums and consultations of a popular type. The ONPE is also 
responsible for the verification in the number of adherents to political parties in Perú. 
It also has an educational role, developing activities throughout the country to give an 
understanding of the Peruvian electoral system. The body is also in charge of carrying 
out the electronic vote, which was introduced for the first time in an election in 2006. 
Finally, ONPE publishes electoral results. This information is available on its website, 
with the electoral results since 1995. 
iii) RENIEC: Autonomous body and constitutional character. Among its functions are 
the administration and elaboration of the database with the information of all Peruvians 
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through the national identity document (DNI). In electoral matters, it has a joint role 
with the two previous organizations, elaborating the electoral register, and then sending 
this information to the JNE, who approves the legitimacy of the document and finally 
sends it to the ONPE for its use in the elections. 
In Perú, elections are controlled by the organic law number 26.859. Chapter 1 Article 50 
specifies the official elections that are held in Perú. These elections are: 
a) Presidential elections, which include the processes to elect the President and Vice 
Presidents of the republic.  
b) Parliamentary elections, which include the election of the congressmen of the 
republic. 
c) Elections of judges according to the constitution, which includes the election of 
Judges in accordance with the constitution. d) Referendum and revocation of 
authorities. (LOE, 1995).  
 
The reform of 2006 
In 2006, a reform carried out by Congress changed the way in which the fines were distributed 
throughout the national territory according its level of poverty. In this way, the national 
territory of Peru is divided, from major to minor, into departments, provinces and districts 
which receive a category of extremely poor, poor, and non-poor. This poverty index is 
calculated by the National Statistics Institute and it has been updated for electoral issues. For 
the assignment of the levels of poverty at the level of districts, the INEI utilized the 
methodology of the World Bank made by Elbers, Jean and Peter Lanjouw (2003) crossing 
information obtained from census data and surveys at the household level. 
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Table 2. Categories of poverty in prices 2018 
Level of poverty 
in the district 
Non-poor Poor Extremely poor Citizens with 
residence 
abroad 
Amount of the 
fine in soles 
(2018) 
S/83 
 
S/41.50 S/20.75 
 
S/207.50 
% of the UIT to 
pay after the 
reform of 2006 
2 1 0,5 5 
Convergence in 
Euros (2018) 
€22  €11 €7 €56 
Own elaboration with the amounts of fines published by JNE 2018. Source: 
https://portal.jne.gob.pe/portal/Pagina/Ver/314/page/Multas 
 
Furthermore, there are non-monetary consequences related to the electoral absence. Where the 
realization of contracts, the completion of banking procedures, and the impossibility of making 
trips abroad. It is necessary to mention also, that in case of missing the vote on the day of the 
election, there are two ways to avoid paying the fine. The first one has relation with the 
justifications before the process when the person that was not in the territorial circumscription 
informed in the RENIEC. In addition, there are eight reasons that are considered valid to justify 
the abstention after consummated the election: 
A. A lost identity document, with the corresponding validation of the national police. The 
loss of the document must have occurred in the range of ten days prior to the completion 
of the election. 
B. Due to natural disasters that prevented the person from going to his place of voting. 
C. For being deprived of liberty, in a Peruvian penitentiary center during the day of the 
presidential election. 
D. For reasons related to studies. This justification is related to people who are outside of 
Peru and who have not changed their electoral address in the corresponding consulate. 
E. For health issues, that incapacitate the person to move by their own means. This 
justification must be accompanied by a receipt issued by a doctor. 
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F. By electoral issues. This option refers to the fact that the responsibility falls on the 
organization of the polling place, for lack of the necessary means to vote correctly, for 
lack of material, or because the conditions existing in the polling station not ensure 
normal performance of the vote respecting the privacy of the elector and the anonymity 
in the vote. 
G. By labour issues. Although it is true, employers by law are obliged to give their workers 
enough time to carry out suffrage. Therefore, this option is linked to public workers and 
the armed forces that perform functions related to the correct performance of the 
elections. 
H. For religious reasons. This option is for those people who are enrolled in a cloister 
regime within religious congregations in Peruvian territory. For those people who are 
on religious missions abroad6. 
The second reason is the exception described in Article 9 of the Organic Law on Elections, for 
those over 70 years of age, voting is voluntary (LOE, 1997).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 The information regarding the justifications for absences in the elections are available on the Peruvian 
government website, on the website of the national elections office (ONPE) and on the website of the National 
Electoral Board (JNE) 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY & SOURCES 
To carry out the statistical analysis, it will be used the information regarding the regional and 
presidential or general elections will be used in the period 2002-2016. Considering that the 
number of districts to be reviewed will be 81, and ten elections, there will be a total of 810 
elections to be check. 
In order to exploit this database and achieve a statistical analysis, SPSS (Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences) - a software that allows to relate several variables at the same time - 
was used. As a way to achieve this objective, the tables of contingency were chosen as a tool. 
It also serves as a means to establish if there is a correlation between the period previous and 
after the reform and how this measure affects the percentages in the districts of the sample 
regarding invalid votes, turnout, and people fined by omission (S), or people fined for not 
attending the polling station as a table manager (M). Since, one of the main primary objectives 
of this thesis was to measure the impact of the electoral reform of 2006. It was necessary to 
divided the elections in two groups. That is, the three elections held previous to the electoral 
reform of 2006 and seven elections held after the reform, totalling ten elections to measure.  
 
In order to pursue this aim, it was necessary to codify the database. The compilation of the data 
was done in Microsoft Excel, and the information was encoded in a way that could be processed 
by SPSS. Therefore, it is important to note that for certain values present in this table, it was 
necessary grouping the results by segments in order to have significant results within the 
statistical analysis. As example in red are the groups made in order to have significant results.  
Table 3. Example of crossed table 
 
 
Own elaboration with electoral result published by ONPE (2019) 
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 In this way, the categories of poverty were used as groups for the general analysis of the 
information, grouping all the districts according to their poverty category, in each election.  
 
In order to analyze districts without the categorization of poverty, two groups were made: one 
about the period before the reform including the 243 elections called NC (no category), and 
one after the reform with the three levels of poverty as a whole with 567 elections measured.  
As an example, one of the tables that were used to find significance among the variables is 
presented. 
 
 
Table 4. Example of cross table “Poverty*Fines for omission“ 
 
 
 Own elaboration with SPSS (2019) 
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This will allow us to see if there is any difference in the behavior between the districts before 
and after the reform of 2006. Additionally, it gives the possibility of crossing these two 
categories with the turnout, invalid votes, and the percentage of people fined to compare the 
behavior and the impact of the reform with the categorization of districts by poverty. Then, this 
comparison logic was applied for the period after the reform, while keeping the three poverty 
categories and excluding the category of NC. The idea is to see, in a general way, if there is 
any difference in voter behavior according to the aforementioned variables among these three 
categories. Although this model has limitations, particularly in the cases of districts with values 
close to the edge, the groups were made in a way that it can be as representative as possible. 
The goal is to observe significant trends from the macro level, given the large amount of data 
collected. In order to make use of these sheets and to highlight the cleavage between pre- and 
post-reform period, it was necessary to select a single variable such as poverty level, invalid 
vote, or percentage of people fined. In this, it was possible to check each period of time and 
specific election. In the case of the elections following the electoral reform, variable category 
of poverty was crossed against turnout, invalid votes and percentage of people fined. Tables 
will follow at the end of work to clarify, while supplemental tables can be found in the annex. 
Finally, graphs and tables with the most significant results will be displayed in each election to 
more clearly illustrate if there was an influence or not of the reform on electoral behavior. 
 
Data and sources 
 
Electoral data for this research was collected from two Peruvian institutions in charge of the 
production and storage of electoral statistics: the ONPE and JNE. Data regarding the results of 
the electoral elections carried out at the national level between 2002 and 2016 at the level of 
districts was taken from the ONPE. The detail of the information available in their electoral 
reports, allowed for the collection of the participation of each district. It is important to mention 
that the way to calculate the electoral participation by the ONPE takes into account only the 
percentage of valid votes. Null and blank votes are not taken into account. However, for this 
research, the calculates were made with all votes, including null and blank. This figure often 
appears as "votes cast". With this number of votes, the electoral participation calculation was 
made based on the total number of the electoral roll. 
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In addition, the information referring to the number of people fined for not participating in the 
Peruvian elections, could not be found in the bibliography specialized in electoral matters of 
Perú in the bibliographic reviews made. Said information is not publicly available on the web 
pages of the aforementioned electoral services. For this reason, it was requested using the legal 
recourse of the transparency law7, which exists in Perú since 2002. Finally, with the data 
available on both electoral data from the ONPE and that on the fines implemented from the 
JNE, it was possible to start the data crossing,  
 
Time period 
In order to assess the state of electoral participation and the number of people fined prior to the 
reform (carried out in 2006), the data of the 2002 presidential election was used along with 
presidential elections results from the years 2006, 2011 and 2016. This finally left the period 
to analyze between 2002 and 2016. 
 
Samples 
Because of the large number of districts Perú in 2018,  random selection of one hundred 
districts was chosen for this analysis (CEPLAN, 2019). With the progression of this research, 
this number was reduced to 81, due to the lack of information and inconsistency with numbers 
in some districts as well as the changing composition (i.e. joining others or further subdividing 
themselves) over the course of this time period. With this final selection of districts, the total 
number of elections to reviewed was 810. Moreover, it is necessary to consider that second 
electoral rounds are counted as a separate election for the purposes of analysis.  In the case of 
regional elections, due to the electoral law in Perú established a minimum of thirty percent in 
order to be elected, only in some departments this percent is reach.  
 
Cases 
Through the review of the elections, an exposition of the main findings will be made in each 
election included in the period under study. In this way the regional elections of 2002, 2006, 
2010 and 2014 will be reviewed. General elections will be reviewed in the first and second 
rounds of the years 2006, 2011, 2016. In total, ten elections were considered. A distinction is 
                                               
7 The transparency law in Perú was enacted in 2002 under the presidency of Alejandro Toledo, within 
the process of modernization of the Peruvian State. (MEF,2019) 
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also made between the  elections carried out prior to the electoral reform and the elections held 
later (three and seven elections respectively). 
 
 Formulas 
To calculate the coefficient of variation the following formula was used: 
 
 
Where: 
Cv= Coefficient of variation 
σ = Standard deviation 
X*= Arithmetic media  
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Elections held before the reform 
Regional elections of 2002 
The 2002 regional elections were the first in which the regional authorities were elected by 
direct and universal vote, as part of the process of decentralization by means of the organic law 
Nº 278678. At that time Perú had 1634 districts (ONPE, 2003), which meant a complex logistics 
for the electoral authorities. At the national level, electoral participation increased by five 
points compared to the three previous municipal processes in  
The data review found that the number of people fined in the elections changed considerably 
from the percentages of those fined for electoral abstention before the reform. During the 
regional elections of 2002 and the presidential elections of 2006 in the first and second round, 
the number of people fined was much lower than the percentage of abstention, in other words 
there were people who did not vote, but did not receive a fine. Then, the situation is accentuated 
during the presidential elections of 2006. In addition, the vast majority of these fines 
correspond to fines for not attending positions at the polling station as coordinator of tables 
(M). 
One way to explain this could be that the absence of a person to fulfill their duty to administer 
the polling station generates greater impact because it affects all voters at that polling station. 
Thus, makes it easier to trace the fault from the administrative level and fine it with M. In 
addition, the 2006 reform implied a modernization of the electoral system and the resources 
allocated to the JNE. At the same time, the creation and categorization of the districts required 
a coordination with the National Statistics Institute of Perú, which raised the standards 
regarding the information that was held from the district level. After the implementation of the 
2006 reform, the margin between people fined and abstention stabilizes within 3 percent. In 
this manner, there is a significant increase in the number of people fined for the concept of S. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 The organic law Nº 27867 it was approved during the government of Alejandro Toledo as part of the process 
of modernization of the state.  
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Table 5. Gap between abstention and fines. 
Election Turnout (%) Percentage of people 
fined (%) 
Difference  between 
abstention and fines 
(%) 
Regional 2002 80,02 1,61 18,37 
Presidential 2006 
 
Second round 2006 
86,67 
 
85,20 
0,51 
 
0,56 
13,49 
 
14,24 
The reform begins Percentage of 
participacion  
Percentage of people 
fined 
 
Regional 2006 86,95 9,66 3,39 
Regional 2010 86,21 10,58 3,21 
Presidential 2011 
 
Second round 2011 
78,33 
 
76,27 
18,59 
 
20,62 
3,08 
 
3,11 
Regional 2014 83,86 13,51 2,63 
Presidential 2016 
 
Second round 2016 
74,03 
 
70,38 
22,01 
 
25,41 
3,96 
 
4,21 
Own elaboration with data from ONPE (2019) for turnout and fines from JNE (2019) for the number 
of people fined. 
 
Secondly, we must consider that the Peruvian electoral system contains measures to excuse the 
abstention, what would make the difference between electoral turnout and percentage of people 
fined not fit perfectly. Another reason to explain the difference between fines and people who 
abstained from voting, is that in order to assign the poverty categories to the different districts, 
the electoral rolls had to be revised and updated in a coordinated work with the RENIEC 
(ONPE, 2006). In this way, the existence of people who died or who had changed their electoral 
domicile, were eliminated, reducing the size of the electoral roll. 
Moreover, when we dissect the percentage of the fines made, we see that the majority 
correspond to those of type M. That is, 61.56% are fine M, while  type S fines are 38.44%. 
Considering the low percentage of fines paid, the significance of more fines can hardly be 
considered as a variant that influences electoral behavior. 
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Regarding the number of people who cast invalid votes, this percentage reached 15.46% as 
average of the 81 districts. Unlike the percentage of participation, the dispersion in this 
category is higher, with a CV of 3.94 compare to the CV of 1.08 in turnout showing greater 
heterogeneity in the behavior of the districts. This difference between the districts will become 
more evident with the separation of the districts by category of poverty.  
Another way of doing an analysis would have been to assume that the poverty level of the 
districts would not change over time. Thus, we could have awarded the same level of poverty 
given by the INEI in the first publication of 2006 to the districts prior to the reform. This option, 
however, was ruled out for two reasons. The first one is that the level of poverty as shown by 
the following elections is updated by the National Institute of Statistics. Hence, it cannot be 
assumed that a district will maintain its rank over time. In fact, the tendency in the district under 
study was to decrease in poverty levels. As result, the amount of fines will increasingly affect 
the way of people vote. The inhabitants of the district are expected to change their electoral 
behavior as a result of the reduction in the fine, causing the results to differ in times where the 
amount was equal for the entire country. 
The high percentage of people who voted invalidly during the first electoral round finds support 
in the argument that voters in systems of mandatory regime would exercise the vote with a 
lower level of analysis prior to the elections. On the other hand, the high variability observed 
within this percentage would show that in certain districts this percentage would be quite high. 
 
Figure 5. Summary of Regional elections 2002. 
 
Own elaboration with data from ONPE & JNE (2019) 
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General elections 2006  
The general elections of 2006 were the last elections carried out at national level before the 
reform of the electoral system. In those elections, an electoral ballot was held between the two 
candidates with the highest vote, because none of the candidates achieved more than fifty 
percent of the votes in the first round. The electoral participation at the national level was 
88.71% (ONPE, 2017). While the participation in the sample was of 86,68%. Regarding the 
coefficient of variation in the turnout, this was 0.43. Showing a greater level of homogeneity 
in the results, compared to the regional elections of 2002.  
 
In regard to the number of people fined, the trend of the previous regional election was 
maintained. It represented a marginal number of the total electoral roll with a 0,52 per cent. 
However, this time the proportion of fines changed drastically. Leaving fines M, almost 
exclusively as a percentage of the total fines and reducing almost for complete the number of 
fines for electoral omission or S, with percentages of 97.81% and 2.19% for M and S 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6. Types of fines taken previous the reform 
 
 
Own elaboration with information from the office of accounting administration JNE (2019) 
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This distribution in the type of fine to change, and it will change considerably with the 
application of the reform. In relation to the percentage of people who marked their vote as 
invalid, this number rose by almost 7% from the previous election passing from 15.43% to a 
23.04% respectively. With respect to the dispersion of the percentage of invalid votes, the 
coefficient of variance shows that it remained almost the same, going from 3.94 to 3.64. 
 
General elections 2006 second round 
In the second electoral round of the presidential elections, the tendency for  lower participation 
than the one of the first round was maintained, but not in a significant way. Authors such as 
Paredes and Martinez (2017) indicate that in the peruvian case the high number of options 
presented a record in the first round of general election of 2006 since 1978, something that has 
influenced this trend of high participation. When reviewing the general participation data at the 
country level it is possible to see that the first round obtained a participation level of 88.71%, 
while the second round of voting 87.71% (ONPE, 2019). This shows that participation did not 
decrease significantly. Regarding the dispersion of data, the coefficient of variation shows a 
certain homogeneity in the percentages of participation, with a value of 0.47. 
Furthermore, the trend of fines M on fines S in their distribution levels, where almost all of the 
fines are of type M, is maintained. A small decrease in the number of fines taken for the concept 
of S can be seen, though it is not statistically significant. 
In the second round, there is a notable drop in invalid votes compared to the first round of 
elections. Invalid votes pass from 23.04% of votes to 8.01% of votes. In the same way, the 
dispersion coefficient changes considerably in relation to invalid votes. Going from a 3.64 in 
the first round to a 1.33 in the second round. Thus, one can argue that in the second-round 
invalid votes were less and at the same time the behavior of the districts was more similar.  
One of the explanations that maintains high participation rates, and at the same time explains 
the percentages of invalid votes, is that fines would incentivize a person to vote, independent 
of whether he or she had a political option or not. However, if we refer to the data for 2002 and 
the first round of 2006 delivered by the JNE, we see that the fine does not play a significant 
role. To graph this, the contingency table is presented below with the values of people fined in 
the period prior to the reform that includes 243 elections and is confronted with the information 
related to the elections carried out after the reform. This table shows that in the period prior to 
the electoral reform, 99.2% of the elections carried out received a 12.5% or less percent of 
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fines. This situation changes with the beginning of the reform, distributing the districts between 
the segments of 0-12.5% and 12.5 and 25% respectively. Proving that the number of people 
fined increases considerably after the reform.  
In percentage terms, the number of people fined corresponds to 0.52% and 0.57%. However, 
it is important to emphasize the existence of sanctions related to electoral abstention, that are 
not referred to the fine. For example, a person who does not vote cannot carry out paperwork 
in the public sector, contracts, or bank. It could be that these measures do influence the behavior 
of people when voting. Measurement of this variable, however, is not possible to analyze. It 
affects each person individually, due to the level of importance that the person gives to each of 
these measures separately. Perhaps, a way to measure the importance that people give to the 
different ways that the State has to enforce the vote could be done through interviews or 
surveys. However, it is something that by methodological issues are not addressed in this thesis.  
 
Elections held after the reform 
Regional elections 2006 
The regional elections of the year 2006, are the first elections carried out in which the electoral 
reform of fines was applied. Here, it is possible to make a separation of the districts according 
to their level of poverty for the first time. The said distribution in our sample leaves a total of 
forty-six districts in the category of extremely poor, twenty-seven districts in the category of 
poor and eight districts in the non-poor category. This list will be updated three times for the 
years 2006, 2010 and 2016.  
 
An analysis of the voting at a general level of all the districts shows voter turnout of 85.95%. 
This implies the maintenance of the levels of participation with respect to the presidential 
elections carried out in the same year, and an increase in the levels of participation with respect 
to the regional elections of the year 2002. In the extremely poor category, the percentage of 
voter participation is 86.46%. In the case of districts categorized as poor, the percentage of 
participation is 87.33%. Finally, in the case of the non-poor districts, participation was 
registered in 88,49%. In this election, one would also expect to see the first effects of the 
reform, considering the decrease in the amount of fines, especially for the poorest sectors. 
Nonetheless, with the availability of the results, participation did not decay in any of the three 
38 
 
categories of poverty in an important way. However, it is necessary to consider that the reform 
to the system of fines was published only a couple of months before the elections9. Nonetheless, 
it is also possible that the lack of information about the reform has influenced participation 
percentages, causing them to remain almost the same. Nevertheless, a trend of lesser 
participation among the poorest districts begins to emerge. 
The percentage of invalid votes from all the districts is an average of 17.9% of all votes. When 
making a separate analysis by poverty category, in the districts categorized as extremely poor, 
this percentage represents 20.3%. However, when analyzing the number of invalid votes, this 
decreases to 6.85%, which is almost three times lower than the average of the districts and 12 
percentage points lower than the extremely poor districts. In this way, a correlation could be 
deduced between the socio-economic level and the percentage of invalid votes.  
By reviewing one by one the districts considered extremely poor, we see that the number of 
null votes in one of the districts escapes from the average. The district of Miracosta10, in the 
Province of Chota corresponding to the Department of Cajamarca, presented a percentage of 
one hundred invalid votes. Considering than this data could distort the results, a test was 
conducted without the district previously mentioned. In this way the participation percentage 
decreases from 86.46% to 86.16%. In the case of invalid votes, this percentage drops from 
20.3% to 18.97% of the votes, almost one percentage point, but still eleven points above the 
average of the district considered as non-poor. In relation to districts considered as poor, the 
percentage of participation was 87,33%, keeping within the range of variation with the total 
list of districts. The percentage of invalid votes was 16.39%. This is one percentage point below 
the district average, and close to the behavior of districts considered as extremely poor. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 The amendment to Law Number 28859 was published on August 3 of the year 2006. While the regional 
elections were held on November 19 of the same year. 
10 Only once the analysis of the results it will be done without the district of Miracosta in the regional elections 
of 2006. In the rest of the cases, it will continue to be used in the analysis. As the ONPE website shows, the 
totality of the votes corresponded to null votes 
.https://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modElecciones/elecciones/resultadoserm2006/ 
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Figure 7. Percentage of invalid votes Regional elections 2006 
 
Own elaboration with data from ONPE (2019). 
 
However, the variable that presented the most significant variation was the percentage of fines 
applied. Moving from 0.54% in the last presidential elections to 9.66% of the votes. In addition, 
the trend is reversed, and the fines of type S are for the most numerous. Moreover, making the 
analysis by poverty category in the case of the extremely poor districts, the percentage of people 
fined reached 10.55%. Within this percentage, the number of fines by omission, of type S, 
reached 96.3% of the fines. Besides, it is important to point out that, although the reduction 
was transversal to all the socioeconomic strata in percentage terms, it was large for the districts 
categorized as extremely poor. As seen in the following table, which presents the values of the 
UIT - the unit to measure the amount of fines in Perú.  
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Table 6. Evolution of salary and UIT 2002-2006 
 
Year Minimum 
wage 
UIT Fine as % of 
UIT 
Amount of the 
fine in Soles 
2002 S/410 S/3100 4% 124 
2006 S/500 S/3400 4% 136 
Beginning of 
the reform 
------------- --------------- According 
poverty 
category 
---------------- 
2006* 11 S/500 S/3400 2% (NP) 68 
1% (P) 34 
0,5% (EP) 17 
 Own elaboration with the information of the Ministry of Economy and finance of Perú and table with 
amounts of the fine made by the JNE (2006). 
 
 
In relation to the percentage of people fined in the district classified as non-poor, this 
percentage represented 7.65% of the electoral roll, under the average, but not significantly. In 
addition, the percentages of people fined were proportional to the percentage of abstention. 
Thus, the increase of turnout should be translated into a decrease in the percentage of people 
fined. Despite the obviousness of this assessment, the revision of the data prior to the electoral 
reform, showed that said correlation did not exist. On the other hand, the trend of a greater 
number of fines pursued by S was maintained with 93.58% of the total fines. Moreover, the 
price of the fine to pay for the non-poor strata is cut in half, going from 4% of the UIT to 2% 
of the UIT. In the districts classified as poor, the percentage of people fined was 9.14%. Of the 
total fines paid, type S fines were 95.02%. 
 
 
                                               
11 Regional elections after the reform with categorization by level of poverty. 
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Regional elections 2010 
In the regional elections of 2010, one of the changes observed was the number of districts 
classified as extremely poor. The new disposition of districts was of 30 districts categorized as 
extremely poor, 24 districts classified as poor and 27 districts classified as non-poor. In other 
words, it could be said that extreme poverty decreased in Perú. Regarding the electoral 
participation of all the districts the percentages were 86.20%. When doing the analysis by 
poverty category, the districts classified as extremely poor registered a participation of 85.69%. 
Maintaining the high level of participation and without differing too much from the average. 
In the districts categorized as non-poor. The level of participation registered was 87.08%. Two 
points above the average and one point above the extremely poor respectively. Finally, in the 
case of districts classified as poor, the percentage of participation was of 85.88%. These three 
data suggest that, in this sample, in the regional elections of 2010 the level of participation did 
not vary, after 4 years of the reform that decreased the amounts. 
 
In addition, within the number of invalid votes, the average of all the districts was 22.15%. In 
the revision of invalid votes by poverty categories. In the extremely poor districts, the 
percentage of invalid votes was 25.03%. In the case of districts classified as poor, the 
percentage was 20.98% and in the case of non-poor districts, it was 19.99%. Although the 
percentages between extremely poor and non-poor do not vary significantly, they keep Perú 
within the top of the list of invalid votes in the region. According to IDEA data (2017), Perú 
remains at the top of the list of South American countries with 23.1%12 of invalid votes.  
 
About the number of fines issued for S and M, the tendency is maintained and in the three 
districts the percentage of fines ranges from 10.69% in the extremely poor districts, of 11,25% 
in the districts categorized as poor and 9.86% in the districts categorized as non-poor. In 
addition, the tendency in which most of the fines are M, is repeated. This is paradoxical in the 
sense that a rule such as lowering the amount of fines, which seeks to generate a progressive 
and fairer collection system, at the same time, it charges more fines. On this point, an important 
part of the electoral fines is part of the budget of the institutions in charge of the elections. 
Therefore, a reduction in the amount of the fine also implies a decrease in the amount of money 
                                               
12 IDEA clarified in its website  that this percentage is was taken from its last record of elections held in Peru 
during the Presidential elections of 2016. 
42 
 
collected, generating incentives for the institutions to make the effective collection in a more 
efficient manner. 
 
General elections 2011  
On April 3 2011, the general elections were held in Perú to choose the President of the Republic 
and the members of the Parliament. The average of participation of all the districts was 78.33% 
(ONPE, 2017). In the detailed observation by level of poverty, in the case of the districts 
classified as extremely poor, they presented a level of participation of 73.87%. Being  the first 
time since the electoral results have been analyzed in which participation falls below the 80% 
barrier. This is consistent with the 22.51% of fines applied compared to the total of the electoral 
roll. When reviewing the participation of the districts classified as poor, they present a 
participation of 78.18%. And in the case of the non-poor districts, the electoral participation 
was the highest with 83.43% of the votes. This election would respond in a better way to the 
logic that by decreasing the amount of the fine the poorest sectors would have less incentive to 
vote.  
In the revision of the data regarding to invalid votes, the level of the sample the percentage was 
15,36 per cent of the votes. Later, making the analysis by category of poverty in extremely 
poor districts the percentage increase to 17,74%. Almost the same, as in poor district with 
17,66%. However, in district categorized as non-poor, this percentage represented the 10,65% 
of the votes. Regarding the collection of fines, the trend is maintained and the margin between 
the percentage of abstention and the percentage of people fined is reduced to 3.08% at a general 
level. And it is equal by level of poverty, where the most fined are the extremely poor, then the 
poor and finally the non-poor. This is consistent with the levels of electoral participation.  
 
General elections 2011 second round 
The second round of the elections 2011 were held almost two months after the first round. The 
candidate elected was Ollanta Humala, who in previous general elections of 2006 had come in 
second place. Regarding the participation indices, the trend of a decrease was maintained. At 
the general level of the sample, the 81 districts presented an average participation of 76%. Once 
the analysis was carried out by level of poverty, the levels of participation followed a 
decreasing order of non-poor to extremely poor. In this election, the lowest percentage of 
participation was registered in the extreme poverty group with 71.23% of the votes, followed 
by the districts categorized as poor with 75,81% of participation and finally the districts 
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categorized as non-poor with 82,26% of participation. This is  reflected in extremely poor 
districts being the group that received the biggest number of electoral fines with 96.16% of the 
fines corresponded to fines of type S. 
In relation to the votes considered invalid. At the general level of the sample, the percentage 
of invalid votes was 4,83%, a fall of almost ten point comparing to the first round. In the 
analysis by category of poverty, all groups recorded a decrease in the percentages of invalid 
votes with respect to the first electoral round as well. However, in the case of the districts 
categorized within the extreme poverty group, this decrease in participation from 17,74% to 
5,69% represents the most drastic fall in the elections measured. Therefore, the protest voters 
or those people who had no interest in participating stayed in their homes, thus decreasing the 
percentages of participation and at the same time decreasing the percentages of invalid votes. 
This behavior was also registered in the second round of the general elections of 2006, with a 
drop of 23% to 8% of invalid votes. However, in these elections there was still no distribution 
of districts by level of poverty, so their behavior could not be tracked in isolation. In the case 
of districts in the category of poor, while it is true, they presented a decrease in the level of 
participation of 2 two points reaching a percentage of 76% of the votes, this group decreased 
its percentage of invalid votes by almost thirteen points. Following the same effect seen in the 
group of extremely poor districts. 
On the other hand, in the case of districts categorized as non-poor, percentages of participation 
and invalid votes remained within the same range without showing great changes, with five 
points above the average in the case of participation and a point below the average of the 
districts in the percentage of invalid votes with 3.94%. 
 
Regional elections 2014 
The regional elections of the year 2014 presented in the 81 districts a participation percentage 
of 83% of the votes. Thus, showing an increase with respect to the presidential elections of 
2011 in the first round and a slight decrease of two points with the regional election of 2010 
and 2006. Hence, indicates that in the last three regional elections, the percentage of 
participation has been higher than in the presidential election of 2006 and 2011. In the analysis 
by level of poverty, in the districts of extreme poverty the percentage of participation reached 
82.23% of the votes. The percentage of voters fined reached 14.9% where the percentage of 
fines of type S reached 95.7% of the total. Regarding the percentage of votes considered invalid 
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is 18, 89%. Within the category of poor districts, the participation maintains its closeness to 
the average and not far from the extremely poor districts and non-poor districts, with a 
percentage of turnout of 84,89%. As regard invalid votes, in poor districts find its highest 
percentage with 20,35% of the votes. It would be interesting to check the level of participation 
and invalid votes in the second regional rounds. However, because this type of election is not 
carried out uniformly throughout the country, it has not been included in the sample. To 
conclude with the analysis per category, the district with the category of non-poor reached a 
percentage of 84,8% in turnout and 14,6% in invalid votes. With respect to the number of fines, 
it remains constant and proportional to the percentage of abstention. With a clear predominance 
of fines S, which represent more than 95 percent of the fines in the three types of districts. 
 
General elections 2016 
In the most contested elections in the region in the last decades and with less than one percent 
of difference (Mcnulty, 2017), Pedro Pablo Kuczynski became President of Perú in the general 
elections of 2016. During this election, the average of turnout in the 81 districts was of 74.2%. 
With respect to the votes considered invalid, this number reached 19.4% among all the districts. 
When making the analysis by poverty category, the percentage of participation reaches 66.96% 
in the extremely poor districts, the lowest percentage from all the elections reviewed.  
Concerning the percentage of invalid votes, they reached 18% of the electoral roll. With regard 
to the amount of fines, this reaches 33,48% of the electoral roll, showing an increase in electoral 
absenteeism among the poorest population. The comparison with the non-poor districts comes 
to support this idea. Although it is true, this sector saw the fine diminishes by half, it keeps 
maintaining its participation margins constant over 80%. Giving arguments in favor of 
literature describes a correlation between education, and wealth with high levels of 
participation. Finally, in districts with a category of poverty of poor, the percentages are 
showing similarities with the average of the districts but two points above in the invalid votes' 
category and eleven points below the previous election.   
 
General elections 2016 second round 
 
The second round of the 2016 presidential election is the last election to be examined. It 
presents the lowest participation rates of all the elections seen, with an average of participation 
of 70.38% among all the districts in the sample. When doing the analysis by poverty category, 
the districts classified as extremely poor reached 61.20% in turnout. At the same time, the 
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number of fines taken reaches 33.48% in a sample that with a system of operational fines, 
people still vote less than previous processes. Regarding the number of invalid votes, this 
percentage fell from 18% to eight percent. In the case of participation in the poor districts, it 
differs by almost ten points from the extremely poor with 71 percent of participation. On the 
other hand, their percentage of invalid votes also decreases noticeably, from 19 percent in the 
first round to 8.68 percent in the second round. Finally, in districts with a category of poverty 
of poor, the percentages are showing similarities with the average of the districts but two point 
above in the invalid votes' category and eleven points below the previous election.   
 
Findings 
As already mentioned above, once the data regarding the number of people fined was reviewed, 
the first thing that drew attention was that in the elections prior to the electoral reform, the 
number of people fined by abstention. In these elections the percentage of fines did not exceed 
the 1%, leaving a gap between people who did not vote, and the number of fines registered. As 
a way of showing this with the cross table, the totality of the elections made in the period prior 
to the reform, and the elections carried out after the reform is shown. In this way is possible to 
appreciate that it was in the period prior to the 2006 reform the moment in which the lowest 
percentage of fines was charged. Showing a total disparity with the percentages of 
participation, considering that the percentage of fines should be only slightly lower than the 
percentage of abstention, considering the percentage of people who justify their absence. 
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Table 7. Poverty category * people fined 
 
 
 Own elaboration using SPSS and data from the JNE (2019) 
 
As can be seen in the cross table, in the period before the reform that it is indicated as "no 
category", of a total of 243 cases 241 are inside of the segment 0%-12,5% of people fined. This 
means that during the course of the three elections held only in two districts people were fined 
in more than 12,5 percent. The percentage of these segment was chosen based on the percentage 
of abstention seen during this period. On the other hand, in the period post-reform, districts are 
distributed in a more equilibrated way between the segments of 0%-12,5% and 12,5%-25% 
with 217 and 245 respectively, showing an increase in the number of people fined, more 
accurate with the percentage of abstention registered.  
With reference to the possible explanation of why the fines were not collected, it can be argued 
several reasons. Assuming that the data delivered from the first source by the JNE are correct, 
the extremely low number of fines applied to people shows how bureaucracy can function in a 
way on paper, and otherwise in reality. At the time of the reform, what it can be assumed is 
that the state was looking for a progressive collection system, fairer for its citizens. But in the 
reality, the data indicates that such collections were not being made because people were not 
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being fined. Therefore, when reforming the system of fines, although it is true that people pay 
less, the number of people fined increases considerably. 
Other explanations for this data may be related to the process of modernization of the State 
initiated under the government of Alejandro Toledo in 2002. These innovations may require 
changes in the legal framework, consensus between state functions, training of public officials 
and structures that encourage coordination and teamwork (Garcia Lopez & García Moreno, 
2010). An example is the joint work of four public institutions for the implementation of the 
reform. The INEI in charge of the categorization of the different districts according its poverty 
levels, the RENIEC in charge of updating the electoral roll and the ONPE with the JNE in 
charge of the electoral process and fines. Perhaps, it is not a coincidence that after this reform 
the number of people fined has increased. It was the simple result of a better organized state.  
Also, as a result of the effective collection of fines by the JNE it can see another aspect of the 
reform through the following table, where people are more fined according to their category of 
poverty. This can seem to be an obvious conclusion, but after the corroboration in the number 
of people fined during the period before the reform, it was proceeded to verify if indeed people 
were being fined. Else ways, it is possible to see that in the category of poverty of extremely 
poor the number of people fined in more than 40% occupied the 78% of all districts fined in 
that segment. In the case of poor districts, in the segment 40% or more, only two districts were 
found representing 8,7% of people fined, and in non-poor districts, the number of cases was 3 
representing the 13% of people fined. The segment 20%-40% of people fined shows more 
clearly the difference between poverty and level of people fined. In the extremely poor districts, 
the number of cases represented 53% within all districts with 44 districts, in the case of poor 
districts the percentage of people fined represented 36,6% with thirty districts inside the 
segment 20%-40% and finally non-poor districts with 8 cases representing 9,8% within all the 
districts. This table is important because proves that extremely poor people are more fined than 
non-poor people but anyway are voting less at the end. 
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   Table 8. Poverty category* people fined 
 
  Own elaboration with SPSS (2019). Elections after reform. 
 
In the line of analysis of participation, it was possible to confirm the first notorious fall in the 
general elections of 2011, something that it was accentuated in the second round of the same 
process. However, this drop-in participation is not progressive, considering that participation 
percentages were around 80% in all three categories of poverty in the regional elections of 
2010 and 2014. Furthermore, it is not possible to adjudge the total responsibility of the fall in 
the levels of participation of the poorest segments of Perú to the reduction of the electoral fine. 
For example, authors such as Solijonov emphasize the fact that electoral participation has fallen 
sharply since the nineties globally, "and continued its decline to reach 66 per cent in the period 
of 2011-15" (2016:23), thus it can be presented as a counterargument to blame only in the 
reduction on the fine. At any rate, even the lowest percentages of participation during the 
elections held in Perú would be within the global average. 
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     Figure 8. “Countries with compulsory voting system and decrease in turnout” 
 
       Source. IDEA (2016) 
 
Furthermore, what can be evidenced, is a fall in the levels of participation in the poor and 
extremely poor districts more stressed than in the non-poor districts, since the first election 
with differentiated fines carried out in 2006. Another reason that could explain this 
differentiation in the participation according to the level of poverty, is that over the years the 
categories of poverty have also changed. So the number of districts categorized as extremely 
poor has decreased. Through this process, over time, the districts that escape from the category 
of extreme poverty and become poor, or the poor districts that become non-poor, ended up 
making the analysis more homogenous So in the case of existing correlations of wealth and 
electoral behavior, these would be exacerbated over time. The same logic can be applied for 
the other two groups of poverty.  
 
 
 
 
50 
 
Figure 9. Historic turnout between 2002-2016 according to the category of poverty 
 
Own elaboration with the participation averages according to the ONPE (2019) and according to the 
poverty category delivered by the JNE (2019). 
 
Another aspect to consider is the fragility of the economy of the poorest sector in the Peruvian 
society, that would make them more sensitive to changes in fines amounts than the less poor 
districts. When analyzing these data taking into account the state of poverty in Perú, in official 
terms to the year 2018 the minimum salary in Perú is 930 soles, an amount that has grown 
exponentially in the last 2 decades in Perú as a result of the opening of its markets and the 
adoption of neoliberal policies since the Presidency of Alberto Fujimori. Nonetheless, 
following the path of the South American countries, this increase in the minimum wage is 
disproportionately low in comparison with the increase in wealth of the highest strata of 
society. This is reflected in the Gini coefficient of Perú13, a measure were its value is zero in a 
country where everyone has the same income and 1 in a country where one person has all the 
                                               
13 The GINI coefficient of Perú in the period 2014,2015, 2016 was 0.43. By way of comparison, in the 
European Union the coefficient in the same period was 31, 31, and 30 respectively. Source World Bank: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=PE 
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income (OECD, 2016). Passing from almost a third of the minimum wage to represent two 
percent of the minimum wage for the poorest sectors it meant that the decrease in the  amount 
of the fine for the extremely poor segment of the population was significant, founding support 
in the research made by Paredes and Martinez (2017). 
Additionally, some consideration must be taken into account. While it is true, the minimum 
wage in Perú, increased in the last two decades, there is a high number of people who work 
without a contract and that precisely belong to the lowest social strata. Taking a definition of 
labor informality generally accepted as "individuals who are self-employed in the sense that 
they do not work for any particular employer or firm" (Smith & Wandner, 2011:1) informal 
market maintains a large part of the local economy, which structurally affects the lives of 
people. By not contributing taxes, these workers are stripped of basic social rights such as 
pensions and health care, which leads them to be in a situation of high vulnerability. In the case 
of illness, there is no coverage and no compensation for days not worked. This figure is not 
less in the Peruvian context, where according to projections for the year 2050 the six percent 
of Peru's gross domestic product would be produced in informal markets (CEPLAN, 2016). On 
the other hand, a large part of the people that make up this group are from indigenous ethnic 
groups, in a country where the relationship between poverty and being indigenous is strong. 
For these reasons, it is understandable that the Congress wanted to equate the system by making 
the poorest people pay a lower amount for not attending the elections. What they might not 
have considered was that by doing the reduction of the fine in such a drastic manner, the state 
weakened its most effective tool to enforce the poorest sector to attend the elections. 
Regarding the fall in participation, there is an exception in the regional election of 2014 that 
presented higher rates of participation than the presidential elections of 2011. This tendency is 
the same on the three levels of poverty. Among the possible explanations of why the regional 
elections have a higher level of participation than the general or presidential ones, it could be 
that the regional authorities are seen as a closer and more operative institution, with actions 
that will have greater impact on the daily life of the people. With the process of regionalization 
initiated in Perú in 1989 (Contraloria of Perú, 2014) the departments, which is the largest 
political and administrative unit, began to obtain budgets independent from the central power. 
As well, democracy becomes more evident and direct among citizens making the role of the 
state more visible, increasing citizen participation and improving the quality of institutions, it 
could be a factor that make Peruvians more involved in regional elections than in presidential 
ones.  
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In addition, the constant scandals of corruption that have involved all the presidents 
democratically elected since 1990 could be another reason to explain the low participation in 
the general elections compared with the regional ones. In the case of the former presidents, 
while it is true, since Alberto Fujimori, all have been able to finish their mandates. Once they 
leave the presidential band, they fall into the hands of justice. 
Another element to consider, are the elections for the Congress that take place on the same day 
as the presidential elections. An institution that is not seen as credible by citizens14. To this 
argument, Carlos Ponce (2015) mentions how the Congress of Perú became the most 
unrepresentative of the region due to the number of member of the chambers and the inhabitants 
of the country. Indeed, in term of numbers of size at the international level the comparison is 
only compatible with smallest countries such as Israel, Gabon, or Senegal with the difference 
that the addition of all the inhabitants of these countries result in less person than Perú (Tuesta, 
2004). This adds to problems of corruption and distrust in the parties of the congressmen plus 
the low credibility in the presidential figure and the congress, it could exacerbate the effect 
produced by the reduction in the amount of the electoral fine reducing. Furthermore, the first 
election in which there was a clear differentiation in the levels of participation was in the 
general elections of the year 2011. As shown in the following table, it can be seen more clearly 
how for the first time the districts are grouped around their poverty levels in a homogeneous 
way in disparate segments of participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
14 According to the data delivered by IPSOS The credibility of the Peruvian Congress was 31% (2006), 20% 
(2009), 9% (2013), 22%(2016). Source https://bit.ly/2Hq04py 
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Table 9. Poverty category * turnout percentage General elections 2011 
 
Own elaboration with SPSS and electoral data from ONPE (2019) 
In the case of the segment of districts that had a percentage of participation equal to or less than 
65%, the 83% of the total of districts that fall into this category correspond to the districts 
categorized as extremely poor, showing for the first time an average of participation under 70 
percent and in also concentrated in the same level of poverty. At the other extreme, of districts 
with participation percentages above 85%, those categorized as non-poor reach 65% of the total 
number of districts, while the extremely poor reach 10% and the poor 25% respectively. In 
summary, what can be said is that the reduction of the fine was sharp for the poorest sectors 
that came to pay almost ten times less than before the reform. This would not generate enough 
incentives to get people to the polls. As well, it would keep the districts classified as non-poor 
within similar ranges of participation, something that finds support in the literature that 
explains the correlation of wealth, education and participation.  
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Another element visualized during the revision of the data, it was the behavior of the voters of 
the poorest sectors and its interaction with invalid votes during general elections. In the same 
way as the percentage of participation was declining over the years, due, among other factors, 
to the reduction of the electoral fine, the number of invalid votes decreases in a more notorious 
way. As can be seen in the following figure, in the first and second rounds of the 2006 general 
elections, the division between categories of poverty was not made yet. Thus, it is not possible 
to see the behavior according to categories of poverty. Anyway, it can be seen a clear decrease 
in the percentage of people marking an invalid vote between the first and the second round. 
Figure 10. Invalid votes in general elections 2006-2016 
 
Own elaboration using the electoral data of ONPE (2019). 
 
Later, during the general elections of 2011, with the categorization by poverty levels it was 
possible to observe how during the first round the percentage of people who mark an invalid 
vote was similar among poor and extremely poor districts with 17%. While it is true, in non-
poor districts the percentage of invalid votes was 10,65%, it represents a smaller gap than the 
one existing in the participation. The interesting thing is that in the second round, this 
percentage decreases almost to the same level in all the categories of poverty with percentages 
of 5,69% (EP), 4,77% (P), and 3,94% (NP). Something that became more visible during the 
general elections of 2016, with all the districts within the range of 14,91% and 18,11% of 
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invalid votes in the first round, and then diminishing to 8,17%, 8,68%, and 4,45% from 
extremely poor to non-poor. In the following graph can be seen that the three categories of 
poverty in the second electoral rounds are almost at the same level. This situation of falling in 
the percentages of invalid votes in the second electoral rounds it could also happen in the case 
of regional elections. Moreover, because the second round for regional elections does not take 
place in all the departments at the same time, it is not possible to extend the analysis to this 
level.  
Among the possible explanations for this phenomenon could be found in the fact that with the 
decrease in the number of voters, those who persist in exercising their right to vote in the second 
round would have an additional motivation, considering that the effect of the fine became a 
weak measure to enforce people to vote. This finds support also in the literature that describes 
as in compulsory voting systems, the percentage of invalid votes would come to represent the 
percentage of abstention. As well, this behavior is in line with the literature that describes that 
in the second electoral rounds the number of invalid votes decays in the Latin American context 
(Cohen, 2016) were votes becomes more valuable if the elections are more competitive. As an 
example, we can mention the result of the presidential elections in the second round of 2016 
between Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and Keiko Fujimori, in which the center-right candidate 
obtained 50,12% of the votes against a 49.88% on the part of Fujimori making these elections 
the closest elections in the history of Perú and the most hard-fought that has record in South 
America at the presidential level. In this context, the percentage of invalid votes was 7,08 
percent. What calls the attention of this situation, is that although it is true, Hirczy (1994) and 
Cohen (2016) raise a relation between the regimes with compulsory voting and the proliferation 
of invalid voting. None had mentioned that in the second turns the behavior of people, 
independent of their social class, becomes more homogeneous. Partly, certainly, due to the 
special characteristics of the Peruvian case that has its population divided by poverty 
categories. However, it can be considered as a small finding of this thesis.  
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Conclusion 
The debate regarding compulsory voting takes importance considering the low participation 
rates in elections around the world in the last decades. Therefore, in the states in which the vote 
is compulsory, the rules to enforce its citizens to go to the polls appears as the key element 
when establishing the success of its electoral system. In the Peruvian case, as evidenced 
throughout this thesis, it can be seen how a measure that sought to turn the system into 
something fairer, ended up making the fine not relevant, and inoperative to enforce people to 
vote, diminishing specifically the participation of the poorest. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
mention that fines are one variable among many others that influence the behavior of the voter. 
Therefore, their interaction with the aforementioned elements such as the lack of credibility of 
the politicians, the high economic fragility of the people living in the poorest segments of the 
population, or territorial characteristics in which there are still large non-urbanized spaces 
could further decrease the incentives to vote. 
 
With the data exposed, it is possible to confirm the correlation of wealth and participation, that 
already has a vast support in literature, due to results showing that non-poor districts are having 
higher levels of participation in every election measured since the beginning of the reform. 
Moreover, even with the results of the regional election of 2014, which show an increase in the 
electoral participation with respect to the presidential elections of 2011, the poorest districts 
were always those that had the lowest levels of participation. In this way, making the hypothesis 
that a decrease in the amount of the fine would affect the participation of the poorest districts 
more than the non-poor districts can be considered positive. Regarding the implications of this 
type of policy the debate is more complex. For one side, it can be argued that in this way the 
poorest segments of the population are under-represented, and as Liphjart (1997) mentions, 
their interests and the promotion of redistributive policies would be affected. However, to prove 
this idea, it would be necessary to make a revision of the way in which these districts are voting. 
Later, make a review of the political programs of the candidates for which the poorest districts 
vote to see if they have a redistributive tendency in the policies they claim to represent. And 
that would be part of another investigation or thesis. In another aspect, with the revision of the 
data obtained from the fines collected by the JNE, it can be observed how the lack of 
communication between state apparatuses can lead to a reform that sought to alleviate the 
economic burden for the poorest, obviates first that the institution in charge of making the 
collection of money, was not properly doing it.  
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In the aspect of the invalid votes, this thesis sought to contribute to the literature that said that 
in the second round of elections the number of invalid votes tends to decrease in the South 
American spectrum. By means of the hypothesis that the reduction of the invalidated votes 
would be transversal to the first and the second round, because with the reduction of the fine 
only the citizens more interested in politics will be the ones attending the polling station. And 
those who were originally going to vote just to not pay the fine, and who were an important 
source of invalid votes, would now stay at home because the fine was much cheaper. However, 
this was not the case, and the pattern described in the literature was repeated, in which the first 
round has a higher number of invalid votes than in the second. Nonetheless, what was 
evidenced and at least until the knowledge of this thesis has not been investigated, that by 
lowering the amount of the fine and therefore reduce incentives and weaken the measures to 
force citizens to vote, the turnout of the Peruvian electorate in the case of the poorest districts 
is similar to the percentages of participation of countries with voluntary system. For example, 
in the general elections of 2011, comparing the global percentages of participation in countries 
of voluntary vote delivered by Solijonov (2016), the percentages of participation were within 
the same range.  
 
Finally, although it is true, the debate regarding the ethical and moral consequences of 
compelling citizens to vote, should also consider aspects such as the guarantees given by the 
states, to guarantee that citizens will find all the necessary tools to make an accurate decision 
according to their needs and convictions. First, in order to achieve this, edges such as public 
education, or an economy that allows people to develop comprehensively in society, and leave 
time to reflect in politics, and not to work only to survive, are pending issues in a 
underdeveloped countries such as Perú. Thus, the jump to the voluntary voting system, requires 
minimum guarantees, that after the bibliographic revision made for this work, still do not exist 
in the Inca country. 
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Appendix 1. List of the 81 district and its categories of poverty in the period 2006-2016. 
Retrieved from http://cort.as/-IQOn 
 
Department Province District 2006R 2010R 2016G 
Cusco Paruro Accha EP EP EP 
Junin Concepcion Aco P P P 
Ayacucho Victor Fajardo Alcamenca EP P P 
Arequipa Caraveli Atico No P No P No P 
Puno Puno Atuncolla EP P P 
Puno Azángaro Azángaro P EP EP 
Piura Sechura Bernal P No P No P 
Lambayeque Ferreñafe Cañaris EP EP EP 
Piura Plura Catacaos P No P No P 
San Martin Lamas Caynarachi EP No P No P 
Ica Nasca Changuillo P No P No P 
Ica Chincha Chavin EP No P No P 
Cajamarca Cajamarca Chetilla EP EP EP 
Lima Huarochiri Chicla P No P No P 
Amazonas 
Rodriguez de 
Mendoza Chirimoto EP P P 
Cajamarca Chota Choropampa EP EP EP 
Huancavelica Churcampa Churcampa P EP EP 
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Cajamarca Chota Conchan EP P P 
Ancash Pallasca Conchucos EP EP EP 
La Libertad Bolívar Condormarca EP EP EP 
Lima Cajatambo Copa EP EP EP 
Cajamarca Celendin Cortegana EP EP EP 
La Libertad 
Sánchez 
Carrión Curgos EP EP EP 
Puno Chicuito Desaguadero P P P 
Amazonas Condorcanqui El Cenepa EP EP EP 
Ica Nasca El Ingenio P No P No P 
Junin Huancayo El Tambo No P No P No P 
Madre De 
Dios Manu Fitzcarrald EP No P No P 
Piura Ayabaca Frias EP EP EP 
Ayacucho Victor Fajardo Hualla EP EP EP 
Huancavelica Castrovirreyna Huamatambo EP EP EP 
La Libertad Julcán Huaso EP P P 
Apurímac Andahuaylas Huayana EP P P 
Madre de Dios Tahuamanu Iberia P No P No P 
Madre de Dios Tambopata Inambari P No P No P 
Tacna Jorge Basadre Ite No P No P No P 
Cajamarca San Marcos 
José Manuel 
Quiroz A EP EP EP 
Cajamarca San Marcos José Sabogal EP EP EP 
Apurimac Andahuaylas Kaquiabamba P P P 
Cajamarca Celendín 
La Libertad 
De Pallán EP EP EP 
Callao Callao La Punta No P No P No P 
Cajamarca Cutervo La Ramada EP P P 
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Madre de Dios Tambopata Las Piedras P No P No P 
Piura Talara Lobitos P No P No P 
Cusco Quispicanchi Lucre P P P 
Cusco Urubamba Machupicchu No P No P No P 
Madre De 
Dios Manu 
Madre De 
Dios P No P No P 
Ica Nasca Marcona No P No P No P 
Ancash Yungay Matacoto EP No P No P 
Cajamarca Chota Miracosta EP EP EP 
Junin Jauja Molinos EP No P No P 
Puno Lampa Nicasio P P P 
Ica Ica Ocucaje P No P No P 
Junin Jauja Paca EP No P No P 
La Libertad Chepen Pacanga P No P No P 
Moquegua Ilo Pacocha No P No P No P 
Junin Tarma Palcamayo P P P 
Ica Pisco Paracas No P No P No P 
Amazonas Luya Pisuquia P P P 
Puno Puno Plateria P P P 
La Libertad Trujillo Poroto P No P No P 
Apurimac Grau Progreso EP P P 
Cajamarca Cutervo Querocotillo EP EP EP 
Huanuco Huanuco Quisqui EP P P 
Cajamarca Jaen San Felipe EP EP EP 
Amazonas Luya Santa Catalina EP P P 
Ayacucho Huanta Santillana EP EP EP 
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Ayacucho Victor Fajardo Sarhua EP EP EP 
La Libertad 
Santiago De 
Chuco Si Sitabamba EP EP EP 
Cajamarca Celendin Sorochuco EP EP EP 
Huancavelica Castrovirreyna Tantara EP EP EP 
La Libertad Pataz Taurija EP P P 
Pasco Pasco Ticlacayan EP EP EP 
La Libertad Bolívar Ucuncha EP EP EP 
Puno Yunguyo Unicachi P P P 
Cajamarca San Miguel 
Union Agua 
blanca P P P 
Cusco Chumbivilcas Velille EP EP EP 
Piura Morropon Yamango EP P P 
Loreto Requena Yaquerana EP EP EP 
San Martin Rioja Yorongos P P P 
Puno Yunguyo Yunguyo P P P 
R:REGIONAL      
G: GENERAL      
 
